Exploiting Rogue Signals to Attack Trust-based Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radio Networks by Jackson, David
Virginia Commonwealth University
VCU Scholars Compass
Theses and Dissertations Graduate School
2013
Exploiting Rogue Signals to Attack Trust-based
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radio
Networks
David Jackson
Virginia Commonwealth University
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons
© The Author
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at VCU Scholars Compass. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses
and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of VCU Scholars Compass. For more information, please contact libcompass@vcu.edu.
Downloaded from
http://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/3072
©David Jackson, 2013
All Rights Reserved
EXPLOITING ROGUE SIGNALS TO ATTACK TRUST-BASED
COOPERATIVE SPECTRUM SENSING IN COGNITIVE RADIO
NETWORKS
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science at
Virginia Commonwealth University.
by
David Jackson
Bachelor of Science in Computer Science
Virginia Commonwealth University, May 2011
Director: Wanyu Zang, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor, Department of Computer Science
Virginia Commonwealth University
Richmond, Virginia
April 2013
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
A special thank you to my family for their love, support, and forbearance throughout my seven
long years of attending Virginia Commonwealth University.
I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my advisor, Dr. Wanyu Zang, who has pa-
tiently guided me through the field of cyber-security. She has been very positive and helpful in my
transition to a research oriented environment, and her uplifting attitude and kindness have made her a
pleasure to work with. I also want to thank Dr. Meng Yu for co-advising me and supporting me in my
classes and research. Both Dr. Zang and Dr. Yu have been inspiring mentors, and I look forward to
learning more from them in the years to follow.
I am especially grateful to Dr. Krzysztof Cios for having the most influence in my decision to
attend graduate school. Without his encouragement, I would have never entertained the idea of higher
education or the possibility of becoming a Ph.D. student. I would also like to thank two esteemed
colleagues of mine, Tyler Malkus and Ellen Korcovelos, for helping me to revise the writing and pre-
sentation of my thesis. Finally, I would like to thank everyone in the Computer Science department,
the faculty and fellow students, for making my time here very enjoyable and deeply fulfilling.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Cognitive Radios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Spectrum Sensing Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Cooperative Spectrum Sensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Common Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.5 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 Related Works 9
3 System Model 11
3.1 System Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2 Propagation Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3 Directional Antenna Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4 Rogue Signal Framing Intrusion 17
4.1 Security Enforced at the Physical Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
iii
4.2 Trust Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.3 Motivation for Directional Antennas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.4 Two Types of Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.5 Trust Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.6 Attack Evaluation of Type-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.7 Attack Evaluation of Type-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5 Rogue Signal Framing Defense 28
5.1 Overview of Networks and Clustering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.2 Cluster Analysis Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.3 Resilient to Exploitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.4 Defense Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6 Conclusion 37
iv
List of Figures
1.1 The spectrum shortage problem depicted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Causes of the hidden node problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1 Model of Simulation Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2 Model of Cooperative Spectrum Sensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3 A simulated shadow fading spatial map, from Eq. 3.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.4 Model of Directional Antennas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.1 The two outcomes of rogue signals in trust-based CSS protocols . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.2 RSF Impact - measures trust damage, from Eq. 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.3 Trust damage over 100 quiet periods with respect to beamwidth, and the corresponding
PUE success rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.1 Example of assortative mixing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.2 RCDClustering - illustrates the clusteringmethod between rogue signals and randomly
selected malicious sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.3 RCD performance - measures trust saved from Eq. 5.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
v
5.4 RCD Sensitivity - counts the number of sensors protected by the RCDmodule for RSF
and SSDF attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
vi
Nomenclature
H0 Null Hypothesis: absence of primary signal
H1 Alternative Hypothesis: existence of primary signal
ASIC Application-Specific Integrated-Circuit
CPE Customer Premise Equipment
CR Cognitive Radios
DoS Denial of Service
DSA Dynamic Spectrum Access
FC Fusion Center
FCC Federal Communications Commission
GD Global Decision
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
PU Primary User
PUE Primary User Emulation
vii
RCD RSF Clustering Defense
RSF Rogue Signal Framing
RSS Received Signal Strength
SSDF Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification
SU Secondary User
WRAN Wireless Regional Area Network
viii
ABSTRACT
EXPLOITING ROGUE SIGNALS TO ATTACK TRUST-BASED COOPERATIVE SPECTRUM
SENSING IN COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORKS
By David Jackson
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science at
Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2013.
Major Director: Wanyu Zang, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor, Department of Computer Science
Cognitive radios are currently presented as the solution to the ever-increasing spectrum short-
age problem. However, their increased capabilities over traditional radios introduce a new dimension
of security threats. Cooperative Spectrum Sensing (CSS) has been proposed as a means to protect
cognitive radio networks from the well known security threats: Primary User Emulation (PUE) and
Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification (SSDF).
I demonstrate a new threat to trust-based CSS protocols, called the Rogue Signal Framing (RSF)
intrusion. Rogue signals can be exploited to create the illusion of malicious sensors which leads to
the framing of innocent sensors and consequently, their removal from the shared spectrum sensing.
Ultimately, with fewer sensors working together, the spectrum sensing is less robust for making correct
spectrum access decisions. The simulation experiments illustrate the impact of RSF intrusions which,
in severe cases, shows roughly 40% of sensors removed. To mitigate the RSF intrusion’s damage to the
network’s trust, I introduce a new defense based on community detection from analyzing the network’s
Received Signal Strength (RSS) diversity. Tests show a 95% damage reduction in terms of removed
sensors from the shared spectrum sensing, thus retaining the benefits of CSS protocols.
Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter covers the background of my research in the area of cognitive radio networks and their
security. Included are the topics of dynamic spectrum access, cooperative spectrum sensing, as well as
the common attacks against cognitive radio networks for comparison. Lastly, the section outlines my
contributions.
1.1 Cognitive Radios
Cognitive Radios (CR) are adaptive radios that are designed for improved performance and flexibility
in wireless communications over the traditional radios that are built upon the more rigid Application-
Specific Integrated-Circuit (ASIC) devices. Unlike their predecessors, cognitive radios can be pro-
grammed to have any of the following qualities: awareness of their operating environment and their
own capabilities, autonomous operations to achieve the radio’s goal, and the ability to learn and adapt
from past experiences [1]. Their most distinguishing feature is autonomous frequency agility, the abil-
ity to change channels dynamically over a broad range of radio-frequency electromagnetic spectrum
without the need of user interaction. In contrast, traditional radios broadcast on a single, fixed fre-
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(a) Inefficient allocation of spectrum bands
(b) Spectrum shortage for mobile broadband
Figure 1.1: The spectrum shortage problem depicted
quency channel such as the AM/FM radio stations, television networks, cell phones, and so on. In
these examples, both the broadcaster and listener have to be tuned to the same frequency to receive a
particular service such as music from an FM radio station.
In recent years, the growing demand for wireless services shows an inevitable overcrowding of
the spectrum bands, in large part due to the rapid increase of wireless mobile services. The Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) has assigned spectrum bands to licensed users for exclusive use
on a long term basis, precluding anyone else from access [2]. Yet, analysis of the spectrum bands
clearly indicate that current FCC policies have created severely under-utilized spectrum bands (i.e.
unused wireless channels), causing a bottleneck for new wireless services. Fig. 1.1a [2] depicts these
under-utilized spectrum bands across the usable radio-frequency spectrum. Fig. 1.1b [3] depicts an
example of the spectrum demand for mobile broadband services surpassing the available spectrum as
early as mid-2013. This example illustrates the need for innovative solutions to alter the trajectory of
overcrowded spectrum bands. Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) is the proposed solution to alleviate
the overcrowding of bands by allowing licensed users, also known as primary-users (PUs), to share
unused spectrum with non-licensed secondary-users (SUs) in an opportunistic fashion [2, 4]. An ex-
ample of a primary network consists of a TV broadcasting station (i.e. the primary transmitter) and the
corresponding subscribed viewers (i.e. the primary receivers) [5, 4].
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Cognitive Radios are the devices that enable DSA due to their ability to scan spectrum bands
and locate the best available channels on a non-interference basis [6]. The exact definition of cognitive
radios has evolved and branched off into different meanings. The FCC defines cognitive radios as “a
radio system whose parameters are based on information in the environment external to the radio sys-
tem.” [7] The National Telecommunications and Information Agency (NTIA) has proposed cognitive
radios to be defined as “a radio or system that senses its operational electromagnetic environment and
can dynamically and autonomously adjust its radio operating parameters to modify system operations,
such as maximize throughput, mitigate interference, facilitate interoperability, and access secondary
markets.” [7] However, Joseph Mitola was the first to coin the term “Cognitive Radios” in 1999 and
explained it as an intelligent agent that could search out ways to deliver services and adapt the network
protocol stack to better satisfy the user’s needs [8]. The key aspects associated with Mitola’s vision of
cognitive radios is that they are [7]:
• Aware of surrounding environmental conditions (e.g. the interference for some channel) and the
radio’s internal state such as the operational parameters for some wireless service;
• Adapting to its environment in real time (e.g. switching to a less noisy channel) to satisfy the
requirements of some wireless service (e.g. message integrity or Quality-of-Service);
• Reasoning on observations to make the best known decisions, which include how to adapt to a
particular scenario;
• Learning from previous experience to improve its reasoning capabilities; and
• Collaboratingwith other devices to make decisions based on collective observations and knowl-
edge.
These key features require the implementation of artificial intelligence algorithms as an integral
part of the CR. However, the research community remains divided on howmany, and the scope of, these
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features a radio must possess before it is considered a CR. The first large scale standard for cognitive
radios, the IEEE 802.22, is primarily focused on frequency agility that addresses the mitigation of
interference to PUs [7]. Although cognitive radios are associated with frequency agility and DSA,
neither of these features alone account for the main intelligent attribute that cognitive radios were
initially known for.
Regardless of how cognitive radios are being interpreted, they are being pushed as the means to
solve the spectrum shortage problem by utilizing much of the untapped spectrum bands as illustrated
in Fig. 1.1a. The secondary network, consisting of cognitive radios, is given permission to coexist
in licensed channels under two preconditions mandated by the FCC: (1) giving spectrum priority to
licensed users and (2) minimizing interference to licensed users. The faster the SUs can detect the pri-
mary signal and vacate the licensed channels, the smaller the interference to the PUs, thus allowing then
the secondary signals to collide less frequently with the primary signal. For this reason, the secondary
network must achieve accurate spectrum sensing to know exactly when PUs occupy the channel.
1.2 Spectrum Sensing Methods
Energy detection is perhaps the simplest and most common type of spectrum sensing due to its low
cost and the fact that it requires no prior knowledge about the signal characteristics of PUs [9]. An
energy detector infers the existence of a PU based on the measured Received Signal Strength (RSS),
but it cannot distinguish between PUs and SUs on signal strength alone. To overcome this, all SUs
must halt transmission simultaneously in order to listen for the primary signal in a process called the
quiet period.
Signal feature detection is an alternative technique that uses either cyclostationary feature de-
tection or matched filter detection to capture special characteristics of a primary signal. However,
relying solely on signal feature detection may not be adequate to authenticate the primary signal. For
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example, in a primary network of subscribed TV viewers, an attacker can transmit previously recorded
TV signals that replicate the characteristics of the primary signal [10]. Here, the signal feature detec-
tion would fail to differentiate the attacker from the TV broadcasting station. Moreover, conventional
replay-attack defenses that require Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) cannot be applied on CR networks,
since the FCC mandates require the secondary network to be self-sufficient in detecting the primary
signal without any action from the primary network [6]. Hence, key sharing between the primary and
secondary networks is not a viable option.
1.3 Cooperative Spectrum Sensing
The cornerstone of the IEEE 802.22 requires the secondary network to surrender channel occupation
immediately after detecting the primary signal within the contour region, an area where the primary
network is to be protected from interference. Yet, perhaps the biggest obstacle to commercializing
cognitive radios is guaranteeing a minimal level of interference to the primary network. This requires
that cognitive radios have the ability to reliably detect, in real time, the presence or absence of a primary
signal from a given spectrum band. Otherwise, these cognitive radios can unknowingly transmit signals
simultaneously with the primary transmitter, causing unacceptable levels of interference to nearby PUs.
Such unintended interference can arise from the hidden node problem. Fig. 1.2a depicts an SU
obscured from the primary transmitter due to obstacles in the environment, in what is called shadow
fading. Hence, the SU continues to occupy licensed spectrum bands simultaneously with nearby PUs.
Additionally, an SU may not detect the primary signal because of multipath fading. This is caused by
multipath propagation, the phenomenon that results in a radio signal reaching the receiving antenna
in more than one path. In other words, wireless radio signals bounce off physical obstructions, prop-
agating into new signal copies each time, and culminate into a less audible and weaker signal at the
receiver. Fig. 1.2b depicts an SU unable to detect the primary signal due to multipath propagation.
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Primary Transmitter
(a) Shadow Fading (b) Multipath Fading
Figure 1.2: Causes of the hidden node problem
Research results from [2] indicate that shadow fading and multipath fading can be alleviated
by requiring multiple SUs to cooperate with each other to conclude the spectrum availability. This
collaboration of sensors, calledCooperative Spectrum Sensing (CSS) has been proposed as an effective
approach for boosting the detection of primary signals in CR networks [4, 9]. In centralized CSS, the
SUs submit their sensor reports to the fusion center (FC), which is a server for aggregating and cross-
examining the network’s sensor reports for a more robust analysis of the spectrum availability. Here,
the FC collects the network’s sensor reports and outputs a global decision to notify SUs if they can
access a licensed spectrum band. In decentralized CSS, each CR operates as a local FC such that each
node makes a local decision on spectrum availability based on its neighbors’ data.
1.4 Common Attacks
When a PU is detected on a licensed spectrum band, all SUs must vacate and avoid that spectrum
band. In contrast, when an SU is detected, the other SUs may share the channel resources through
techniques like Time-Division-Multiple-Access [4]. However, an unauthorized transmission similar
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to the primary signal can induce an attack called the Primary User Emulation (PUE) which is when
a malicious SU masquerades as a PU in order to monopolize the spectrum resources. For example,
a malicious SU can induce a PUE attack by transmitting signals that emulate the characteristics of a
TV broadcast station in order to deceive the rest of the secondary network. A successful PUE attack
is a false alarm of the primary signal that only affects the secondary network, such that SUs vacate the
spectrum band and give the attacker full spectrum access. This can be regarded as a Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attack and removes the benefits of DSA.
In contrast, a Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification (SSDF) attack is when malicious SUs inten-
tionally share inaccurate spectrum sensing results in order to change the FC’s decision on spectrum
availability. Cognitive radios are employed with Software-Defined Radios (SDRs) that supports the
operational flexibility required for DSA, which differs from traditional hardware-based radios [4]. This
software layer exposes cognitive radios to the threat of malicious software that could manipulate the
spectrum sensing results. Unlike a PUE attack, an SSDF attack is not confined by the laws of physics
and functions by rewriting the sensor reports at the software layer, such as the RSS values for energy
detectors. As such, SSDF attacks have the flexibility to promote the illusion or concealment of the
primary signal.
To counter SSDF, various trust models have been proposed to protect CSS [10, 11, 12, 13, 14].
These trust-based solutions build reputations of reporting sensors and filter out sensing reports from
those with low reputations. Thus, they can single out attackers andmitigate their influence in the shared
spectrum sensing.
1.5 Contributions
I find that the sensor reputations are exploitable by rogue signals in trust-based CSS protocols. In sec-
ondary networks, it is very hard to conclude the root cause of bad sensor reports; such asmalfunctioning
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sensors, the hidden node problem, SSDF attacks, and rogue signals. The trust-based protocols treat all
inaccurate sensor reports the same way in that they suffer reputation loss. As a result, attackers can
cause inaccurate sensor reports by transmitting narrow rogue signals in order to destroy the reputation
of the targeted sensors. Accordingly, I present a new threat to a variety of trust-based CSS protocols,
which I name the Rogue Signal Framing (RSF) intrusion. To launch this attack, I exploit directional
antennas to isolate a radiation pattern to a group of sensors in close proximity. The outcome is the
emulation of an SSDF attack by having rogue signals raise the RSS of a group of sensors much higher
than those outside the rogue signal’s reach. This contrast leads to innocent sensors being treated as
malicious, and consequently removed from the shared spectrum sensing.
To counteract this new threat, I propose a new defense scheme, which I named the RSF Cluster-
ing Defense (RCD) module, that looks for dense clusters of sensors from the proximity and similarity
of sensor reports in order to look for isolated radiation patterns caused by the RSF intrusion. Thus,
the RCD module can distinguish sensors under the RSF intrusion and mitigate the trust damage. I also
show that the RCD module is resilient from exploitation by SSDF attack.
The rest of this paper is outlined as follows. Chapter 2 reviews common CR network attacks
and trust-based CSS protocols. Then, I present the system model in Chapter 3, and show the details
and analysis of the RSF intrusion in Chapter 4. I propose the RCD module, which defends against the
RSF intrusion, evaluate its performance in Chapter 5, and conclude the paper in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Related Works
My work is mostly related to the following attacks and defenses in CR networks.
While CR networks are vulnerable to a variety of attacks [6], there are two attacks that have
received much attention. One such attack is the Primary User Emulation (PUE) [15, 6], where an
attacker masquerades as the primary transmitter from the vantage point of its neighbors. The other
attack is the Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification (SSDF) [4, 10], in which compromised users falsify
the local spectrum sensor reports in order to obscure or create the illusion of the primary signal at the
FC [16]. Both attacks affect the FC’s perception of the primary signal, ultimately leading to wrong
decisions of spectrum accessing. In contrast, the RSF intrusion disrupts the trust between the FC and
sensors, which makes the spectrum sensing less stable.
Tom Clancy et al. [6] lists a host of threats such as sensory manipulation attacks, belief ma-
nipulation attacks, and objective function attacks to cognitive radios with embedded learning engines.
However, the RSF intrusion focuses on CR networks with trust schemes and cooperative spectrum
sensing, allowing it to work independently of the learning engine.
Bauer et al. [24] demonstrates an attack on localization techniques with directional antennas.
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The choice of environment for testing the attack was designated for the IEEE 802.11 Wireless Local
Area Network (WLAN) environment in an office floor. With the exception of attacking with direc-
tional antennas, the RSF intrusion differs in both the environment and objective. In particular, the RSF
intrusion is intended for the IEEE 802.22 Wireless Regional Area Network (WRAN) environment and
damages sensor reputations instead of corrupting localization techniques.
To defeat the PUE and the SSDF attacks, several trust-based schemes were developed. Chen
et al. [10] presented a sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) weighted by reputation to mitigate the
impact of SSDF attacks. Their algorithm collects sampling votes on the detection or absence of the
primary signal, weighing each vote according to the sensor’s reputation. For every vote identical to
the global decision, the sensor’s reputation is incremented, such that their vote carries more weight in
future decisions made at the FC. Kaligineedi et al. [11] presented a pre-filtering average combination
scheme, where the scheme’s filters are responsible for (1) removing extreme outlier sensor reports and
(2) ignoring sensors that have continuously deviated from the majority over a certain period of time.
Arshad et al. [13] presented a beta reputation system model for hard-decision CSS protocols. Similar
to [10], the sensors are rewarded for agreeing with the global decision, and otherwise penalized. The
similarity of these defense approaches is to build reputations for spectrum sensors and thus filter out
sensing reports from less trustworthy sensors. However, my work shows that the reputations can be
manipulated all too easily, resulting in good sensors being framed and removed from shared spectrum
sensing.
10
Chapter 3
System Model
This chapter discusses the environment used for simulating the Rogue Signal Framing intrusion and its
defense. This includes the network layout, the propagation models, the environment’s shadow fading,
and the attacker’s method.
3.1 System Components
Sensor
Primary Transmitter
0,0
n
n
Attacker
D
Fusion Center
Figure 3.1: Model of Simulation Environment
Without loss of generality, I use a system as shown in Fig. 3.1 to discuss the proposed security
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issues. Within the network area, the sensors si are randomly distributed and the attacking antennas
are positioned at the center. The sensor devices are built in the cognitive radios and operated by the
SUs. Spectrum sensing occurs in scheduled time intervals where all SU communications halt, i.e. the
quiet periods, so that the SU network can listen for the primary signal. The fusion center FC then
collects the sensor reports and cross-examines them to make a global decision GD on the availability
of some channel f0. The GD is a binary hypothesis made after each quiet period that either concludes
the absence (H0) or existence (H1) of the primary signal. Energy detection is the designated spectrum
sensing method, so the sensors are only capable of measuring the RSS locally. However, depending
on the CSS protocol, the sensor reports may only share the local decision (i.e. H0 or H1) instead of
the RSS measurement. I assume the sensors are Customer Premise Equipment (CPE) such that their
positions are fixed and operate within the households of consumers, and thus forms a static network
of sensors, coinciding with the first official standard, the IEEE 802.22, for a wireless regional area
network of CPE cognitive radios that have secondary access to the TV frequency spectrum [5].
...
Fusion Center
s0
R0
s1
R1
s2
R2
sN
RN
Trust
ManagerRCD
GD
H0
H1
spectrum f0
Figure 3.2: Model of Cooperative Spectrum Sensing
Fig. 3.2 shows the flow diagram of operations in my cooperative spectrum sensing model. When
a quiet period starts, the SU sensors listen on channel f0 for the primary signal. Afterward, the SUs
deliver their sensor reports to the FC for concluding the spectrum availability and broadcasting the GD
to the secondary network. For trust-based CSS protocols, the final step includes storing and updating
the sensor trust scores based on the similarity of the sensor reports with the GD, which happens in
the trust manager module. The RCD module in Fig. 3.2 is my proposed solution to protect the trust
manager. Later in Chapter 5, I explain the RCD module in full detail.
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3.2 Propagation Model
I use the Free Space propagation model (watts) to represent the nearby line-of-sight channels of rogue
directional antennas [17]:
PFS(d) =
PtGtGr2
(4d)2
(3.1)
where  denotes the wavelength (meters), and Gt and Gr the antenna gains of the transmitter
and receiver, respectively. I use the stochastic Rayleigh model to portray a more realistic simulation of
the inherent noisy nature of wireless channels [17]. The stochastic equation for the power flux density
(watts) is [18]:
Pray(PFS(d)) = PFS(d)
q
r21 + r22 (3.2)
where r1; r2  N (0; 1).
The greatest factor to affect the RSS (besides attenuation) is the shadow fading gain. The authors
in [19, 20] state that realistic shadow fading is statistically correlated to proximity, such that the shadow
fading gain is typically more similar for any two sensors the closer they are to each other.
For a more realistic system model, I generate a shadow fading spatial map that is derived from
the convolution technique as presented in [20]. This requires a two-dimensional spatial map [x; y] of
shadow fading values, denoted as Ls[x; y], with distribution properties of a zeromean and some standard
deviation L, i.e. Ls[x; y]  N (0; L).
Each position in Ls[x; y] is correlated with another position on a logarithmic scale based on their
proximity, which has been shown to be a sufficient representation of real environments [19, 20]. The
normalized logarithmic correlation can be expressed by the function [20]:
13
(~v) = exp

 k~vk ln 2
Dcorr

(3.3)
where~v is the change in position [x;y], andDcorr is a distance threshold for applying the cor-
relation calculations. Next, each position (x; y) needs to be cross-correlated with all positions by [20]:
L2[x; y] =
NxX
i=1
NyX
j=1
L[i; j]([x  i; y  j)]) (3.4)
where [x; y] is the current position being correlated with all other positions [i; j] from Eq. 3.3. The
equation is repeated until x and y iterate through the discrete ranges 1  x  Nx and 1  y  Ny where
NxNy is the map’s resolution. However, equation (3.4) distorts the shadow fading map’s distribution,
which conflicts with the requirement of having Ls[x; y]  N (0; L). This can be corrected by applying
the following equation to the entire shadow fading map [20]:
Ls[x; y] = (L2[x; y]  L2)
L
L2
(3.5)
where L2 and L2 are L2’s mean and variance, respectively. Fig. 3.3 shows my shadow fading
spatial map Ls[x; y] as a 3D mesh that was generated by Eq. 3.5.
The RSS Ri for any given sensor si is generated by [21]:
Ri =
8>><>>:
N (!; !); H0
10 log10(Pray(PFS(dij))) + Ls[xi; yi]; H1
(3.6)
where dij is the distance between the ith sensor and the jth rogue antenna, ! is the noise power
mean, and ! is the noise variance. The null hypothesis H0 is the conjecture of the primary signal’s
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Figure 3.3: A simulated shadow fading spatial map, from Eq. 3.5
absence. The alternative hypothesis H1 is the conjecture of the primary signal’s presence. I assume
that the channel bandwidth is much larger than the coherent bandwidth, so the effects of multi-path
fading are negligible [5]. Hence, I do not include the multipath fading gain in equation (3.6).
3.3 Directional Antenna Model
My simulations employ directional antennas to transmit rogue signals. The motivation for rogue anten-
nas is explained in Chapter 4. Since the antenna radiates in a smaller area surface, the signal strength
is compressed, increasing the power density (i.e. the RSS). The directive gain of an antenna is [22]:
G(; ) = (4r2)

4
r2sin()sin()

(3.7)
where  and  are the vertical and horizontal angles of the beamwidth, respectively. For simpli-
fication, I assume  =  for equation (3.7). Sensors located outside the area of the radiation pattern
are unaffected, which is to say they are out of range of the rogue signal. To determine which sensors
are attacked, I need to calculate the angle between the attacked sensor and the directional antenna. The
angle between position ~pi of the ith sensor and position ~pj of the jth antenna is:
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ij = arccos

~pi  ~pj
k~pikk~pjk

(3.8)
where ~pi; ~pj 2 R2. The ith sensor can be represented as affected if ij falls between the lower and
upper beam angles l; u of the jth transmitter such that l  ij  u.
θ
φ
Beamwidths
Rogue Antenna
(a) Directive Gain
Rogue Antenna
u
l
ij
Sensor
(b) Beamwidths
Figure 3.4: Model of Directional Antennas
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Chapter 4
Rogue Signal Framing Intrusion
In this chapter, I introduce the Rogue Signal Framing (RSF) intrusion and explain the vulnerability of
sensor reputations to rogue signals and the motivation for attacking with directional antennas. After-
ward, I demonstrate the impact of the RSF intrusion on sensor reputations through various simulations.
4.1 Security Enforced at the Physical Layer
In the Cooperative Spectrum Sensing paradigm, the spectrum sensors (i.e. the physical layer) provide
local signal detection and then reports the results to the FC. Afterward, the FC validates the signal
authenticity through cross-examination of the network’s sensor reports, as portrayed in Fig. 3.2. For
this reason, verifying the source of a signal at the physical layer is incredibly difficult, especially for
energy detectors that can only observe the RSS. Authenticating at the physical layer removes the option
of cryptographic means to identify the source since it is usually done at the network layer [6]. Further-
more, authentication of the primary signal at higher network layers, e.g. packet headers, is prohibited
as a result of restrictions prescribed by the FCC. One restriction in particular states that “ no modifi-
cation to the incumbent system should be required to accommodate opportunistic use of the spectrum
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by secondary users” [15]. In other words, the primary network is not obligated to assist the secondary
network in spectrum sensing, but the secondary network must attest to accurate spectrum sensing so
that they do not interfere with the primary network. As such, solutions that involve any interaction
between the primary and secondary networks cannot satisfy the FCC’s stringent requirements. The
motivation behind the separation of communication between the primary and secondary network is to
avoid placing additional burdens on the licensed users for the sake of the SUs.
Cognitive radios introduce a new dimension of threats into wireless networks. To achieve highly
flexible operating characteristics required for DSA, cognitive radios are implemented as an exten-
sion of the Software-Defined Radio (SDR) platform instead of hardware-driven Application-Specific
Integrated-Circuit (ASIC) devices seen in conventional radios [4]. From a security standpoint, signal
transmission in conventional radio communications is more predictable due to the static allocation of
spectrum bands to specific services and the regulation of the manufactured ASIC-based radios.
Sensor reputations and CSS are often used to perform robust and accurate spectrum sensing
without having to communicate with the primary network, but the question remains on how effective
trust-schemes are at satisfying the FCC requirements. The extended programmability and the opera-
tional flexibility of cognitive radios have dramatically increased the attack surface, in that it becomes
possible to create a wide range of authorized and unauthorized waveforms with a low-cost consumer
devices [23]. In an NSF 2009 workshop, the FCC had raised the question, “What authentication mech-
anisms are needed to support cooperative cognitive networks? Are reputation-based schemes useful
supplements to conventional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) authentication protocols?” [23] Later in
this section, I address certain issues of enforcing reputation-based schemes at the physical layer.
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4.2 Trust Vulnerability
CR network protocols must be self-reliant in minimizing interference to the primary network which
requires accurate spectrum analysis. In the case of SSDF attacks, trust models have been effective at
removing malicious sensors from the shared spectrum sensing [10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. More specifically,
sensors are labeled untrustworthy by the trust manager when they have a consistent history of abnormal
sensor reports. The trust manager judges each sensor equally, in particular the unreliable sensors with-
out regard to the underlying cause. These causes include malfunctioning sensors, malicious sensors,
and sensors affected by the hidden node problem.
Treating all sensors solely based on their reports may at first seem appropriate, but this can also
be perceived as an overly sensitive intrusion detection system. Rogue signals can raise a sensor’s RSS
well above what is expected, especially in the absence of the primary signal. A prolonged rogue sig-
nal on the same group of sensors could cause a sharp contrast of sensor reports from the unaffected
neighbors, thus appearing malicious and no different than SSDF. Consequently, the security protocol
brands these sensors as untrustworthy and removes them from the shared spectrum analysis for as long
as the stigma remains. As such, the RSF intrusion constitutes as an exploitation of the trust model. In
the context of CSS, I define the term Rogue Signal Framing intrusion as follows,
Definition: Rogue Signal Framing intrusion breaks the trust between the fusion center and a
group of sensors via rogue signals to create the illusion of malicious sensors
To launch this attack, directional antennas are used to isolate a radiation pattern to a group of
sensors within proximity, and thereby cause them to report abnormally high RSS values relative to
their neighbors who are unaffected by the rogue signal. This scenario emulates an SSDF attack where
innocent sensors are perceived as attackers, and consequently removes them from the shared spectrum
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sensing. The RSF intrusion should be treated differently than malfunctioning/malicious sensors be-
cause the outcome is a long-term consequence. In other words, well-behaved sensors framed by rogue
signals are ignored over an extended period of time, even after the rogue antenna stops transmitting.
Attackers can leverage the framing of sensors as a stepping-stone attack in order to soften the defense
of trust-based CSS protocols for future attacks, such as PUE and SSDF attacks.
The CSS paradigm can be modeled in the context of the Byzantine Fault Tolerance problem.
Chen et al. [10] described a Byzantine failure as a malfunctioning sensor or an SSDF attack. In both
cases, the sensors perform unreliable local spectrum sensing that could ultimately lead the FC to make
wrong spectrum decisions like the misdetection and false alarm. Amisdetection is when the FC decides
H0 when in fact the primary signal is present, and may result in unacceptable interference to the PUs.
Conversely, the false alarm is when the FC decides H1 when the primary signal is absent, and causes a
DoS of spectrum resources for secondary users.
The RSF’s ability to damage sensor trust does not directly influence the FC’s decision. Instead,
the RSF lowers the system’s fault tolerance, because the FC has to rely on less sensors to infer the
presence of the primary signal. Hence, the RSF weakens the reliability of shared spectrum sensing for
trust-based CSS protocols in the aftermath of the intrusion.
4.3 Motivation for Directional Antennas
Isotropic antennas transmit in all directions, maximizing their coverage. In a network of energy detec-
tors, the RSF attacker may need to limit the rogue antenna’s coverage in order to avoid a successful
PUE, which is an attack on the FC. Directional antennas make it easier to suppress its influence on the
FC and frame the targeted sensors, and thus becomes an attack on the trust manager instead. Thus, di-
rectional antennas provide a greater degree of control over the isotropic antennas for damaging sensor
reputations.
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The second advantage is that directional antennas are difficult to localize (i.e. pinpoint) because
of their ability to transmit rogue signals with narrow and asymmetrical radiation patterns. Worse yet,
the network’s RSS diversity is sensitive to any changes to the beam-direction and beamwidth, further
complicating the localization. Bauer et. al. [24] empirically tested directional antennas against 802.11
localization algorithms which resulted in very high errors. Isotropic antennas, however, leave massive
RSS finger prints in a network of energy detectors due to their wide and uniform radiation pattern.
Chen et. al. [15] proposed an RSS-based location verification scheme to detect and pinpoint PUE
attacks enforced by a dense network of sensors. However, this scheme was not tested or tailored for
pinpointing directional antennas.
4.4 Two Types of Framing
To create an illusion of malicious sensors, there needs to be a separate group of well-behaved sensors
to delineate good-from-bad sensor reports. Unfortunately, classifying sensors as either honest or mali-
cious is speculative, as the FCC regulations remove any obligations of the primary network to assist the
secondary network [6]. Hence, the secondary network is left to assume channel occupancy (i.e. global
decision) with hypotheses like H0 and H1. Therefore, if all sensor reputations are in good standing, the
global decision is typically determined by the majority of sensors.
This is especially true for hard-decision combining, which is when the FC makes a global deci-
sion based on a collection of local decisions, reported by sensors individually, in the form H0 and H1.
Protocols FA and FC use hard-decision combining with sensor reputations. Alternatively, the FC can
perform soft-decision combining to determine the global decision based on a collection of non-discrete
sensor observations, e.g. energy detectors that report the RSS instead of a local decision.
Soft-decision combining benefits from using more descriptive data, but also becomes more vul-
nerable to outliers such as in instances where malicious sensors report abnormally high RSS measure-
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ments. Generally, CSS protocols are designed to reduce the impact of outliers or remove them entirely,
but this still leaves the majority of sensor reports as the determinant of the global decision, just like
in hard-decision combining. As such, a majority of sensors will typically decide the global decision,
even if that majority is comprised of malicious sensors or affected by a wide-reaching rogue signal, as
seen in the case of a PUE attack. In such a case, the FC concludes the disagreeing minority of sensors,
even if well-behaved, are presumed inaccurate. Hence, we define two outcomes of rogue signals with
regard to damaging sensor reputations, called Type-1 Framing and Type-2 Framing:
Rogue Transmitter
(a) Type-1 Framing
SU
s 
ob
sc
ur
ed
(Primary User Emulation)
Rogue Transmitter
(b) Type-2 Framing
Figure 4.1: The two outcomes of rogue signals in trust-based CSS protocols
• Type-1 Framing: a majority of sensors not affected by rogue signals reportH0, so the unaffected
minority of sensors report H1 and appear malicious to the FC, resulting in lower reputation
• Type-2 Framing: a majority of sensors affected by rogue signals report H1, so the unaffected
minority of sensors report H0 and appear malicious to the FC, resulting in lower reputation
Prior to this section, Type-1 Framing has been the designated type of trust manipulation to de-
scribe the RSF intrusion. Type-2 Framing, which is also a result of rogue signals, is worthy of discus-
sion for simultaneously accomplishing an RSF intrusion and PUE attack. Both attacks are manifested
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through radio antennas and can only be distinguished by the attack’s outcome, such as misleading the
trust manager (via RSF) or the FC (via PUE). Hence, a carefully chosen attack coverage that achieves
Type-2 Framing could in fact result in a successful RSF and PUE attack. To my knowledge, the fact
that a PUE attack may inadvertently affect sensor reputations has not yet been considered in previous
literature. I believe Type-2 Framing is important in that it brings about a greater understanding of PUE
attacks against trust-based CSS protocols, which is a very common paradigm of security protocols in
CR networks.
4.5 Trust Damage
The main goal of the RSF intrusion is to damage the trust between the FC and network sensors. Thus,
I use the following equation to measure the network’s trust damage T[q] on quiet period q with:
T[q] =
1
T[0]
X
si2S
ti[q] (4.1)
where ti[q] is the trust score of sensor si 2 S and T[0] is the initial total trust of the secondary
network. For each trust-based CSS protocol, the trust score is represented differently. In order to
compare the trust damage between each protocol, I normalize the trust score ti such that ti[q] 2 [0; 1]
in Eq. 4.1.
In each quite period, a group of sensors may lose their trust due to the RSF intrusion, so T[q]
changes from one quiet period to the next. As the time passes on, sensors become more susceptible
to trust damage under the RSF intrusion, so it is expected T[q] will decrease as the number of quiet
periods q increases.
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Figure 4.2: RSF Impact - measures trust damage, from Eq. 4.1
4.6 Attack Evaluation of Type-1
To test the RSF intrusion, I borrow three trust-based CSS protocols, mentioned earlier in Chapter 2 and
denote them as FA, FB, and FC from [10, 11, 13], respectively.
I make the following assumptions on the simulation’s environment according to an IEEE 802.22
WRAN environment that encompasses UHF/VHF TV bands between 54 MHz and 862 MHz [5]. The
simulations have 400 sensors located inside a 2000 2000 grid. It is assumed here that the incumbent
broadcasting station operates at the UHF frequency of 615 MHz. Like Fig. 3.1, there are four rogue
directional antennas facing the cardinal directions and positioned on the map’s center. Protocols FA,
FB, and FC are tested on three RSF intrusion scenarios, labeled as RSF-15, RSF-30, and RSF-45, and
have antenna beamwidths of 15, 30, and 45, respectively. The simulation parameters are listed in
Table 4.1.
Fig. 4.2 shows the network’s total trust T[q] over 100 quiet periods for each scenario. De-
pending on the protocol and different evaluation environment, the RSF intrusion removed nearly 15%
to 45% of the network’s total trust, correlating to the percentage of sensors removed from the shared
spectrum sensing. As expected, T[q] decreases, eventually plateauing over time as a result of sensors
having no more reputation to possibly lose.
24
Table 4.1: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value Description
Ns 400 Sensors
Nr 4 Rogue antennas
Nx 2000 m Map length
Ny 2000 m Map width
 -92 dBm Sensor sensitivity
f0 615 MHz Channel frequency
! 95.2 dBm Noise power mean
! 0.3 dB Noise power std
d 150 m Distance threshold
L 4.5 dB Shadow fading variance
In Fig. 4.2, the change in the network’s total trust, T[q], per quiet period is different for
protocolsFA, FB, andFC, because a sensor’s trust score is adjusted differently for each protocol. Hence,
these protocols behave differently against rogue signals, but the overall trend is a net loss of total trust
T[q] as q increases. I briefly list the general differences in the three protocol designs that led to the
unequal outcomes of trust damage:
• Protocol FA: sensor trust is adjusted based on whether its local decision agrees with the FC’s
global decision; only applies to a random sample of sensors with varying sizes
• Protocol FB: the rate and scope of trust damage depends on the RSS variance because the FC’s
acceptance threshold of RSS measurements changes with it
• Protocol FC: sensor trust is adjusted based on whether its local decision agrees with the FC’s
global decision; applies to all sensors
From Fig. 4.2, I observe that both protocols FA and FC start to plateau, because the trust ti of
attacked sensors eventually approach 0, causing theT[q] to become stagnant over time. Conversely,
protocol FB differs in that it does not have local decisions to compare to FC’s global decisions. Instead,
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Figure 4.3: Trust damage over 100 quiet periods with respect to beamwidth, and the corresponding
PUE success rate
it uses a dynamic threshold for deciding malicious sensor reports which scales with the RSS variance.
As the attack coverage increases from RSF-15 to RSF-45, so does the RSS variance and the FB’s
behavior towards the RSF intrusion.
4.7 Attack Evaluation of Type-2
Fig 4.1 illustrates two cases of trust damage when the secondary network is bombarded by rogue sig-
nals: Type-1 Framing when the minority of sensors are within the attack coverage, and Type-2 Fram-
ing when the majority of sensors are within the attack coverage. Assuming the network’s trust is in a
healthy state, the sensors that disagree with the global decision will be presumed malicious. However
in Type-2 Framing, the sensors outside the attack coverage will experience trust penalties.
To show this, I tested for the number of attacked sensors and PUE rate with respect to antenna
beamwidth to identify whether trust damage occurs during a PUE attack, or at least from a rogue signal
with a wide attack coverage. I followed the same system parameters from Table 4.1. The RSF is
launched for a duration of 100 quiet periods with a transmission power of 10 mW for each integral
beamwidth, from 10 to 70. The recorded trust damage is based on Eq. 4.1 with a fixed quiet period
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q = 100.
The simulation results of Type-2 Framing are depicted in Fig. 4.3 which shows the trust damage
T[100] and PUE success rate (%) with respect to antenna beamwidth . Trust damage is evident
in all three protocols during successful PUE attacks where the trust damage and PUE success rate are
both above 0. In cross examining these results, a negative correlation can be observed between the
trust damage and the PUE success rate, especially around the 60 beamwidth mark. Hence, I use these
results to reinforce the notion of Type-2 Framing as a result of rogue signals from Fig. 4.1b.
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Chapter 5
Rogue Signal Framing Defense
This chapter introductes the RSF Clustering Defense (RCD) module that operates in three steps: 1)
analyze the RSS diversity, 2) infer the presence of rogue signals from the first step, and 3) identify
and protect the sensors from the rogue signal if detected. The defense relies on the fact that directional
antennas leave isolated radiation patterns that form dense communities of sensors. These sensors report
the existence of the primary signal, either in the form of a local decision or high RSS measurements.
However, malicious sensors can perform SSDF attacks from the software layer without the need of
rogue signals, and thus operates outside the physical limitations of signal properties. Therefore, I look
toward a solution involving community detection and cluster analysis of the sensor network to identify
an RSF intrusion.
5.1 Overview of Networks and Clustering
This section briefly examines the necessary network terms and concepts for better understanding the
RCD algorithm and its motivation. I use graph partitioning and community detection as the basis for
discovering clusters of RSF-attacked sensors. To partition the graph in a meaningful way, I assume
28
the nodes (i.e. sensors) have discrete characteristics such as a type or class. In my system model, the
sensors are classified based on their local spectrum decision such that a given sensor si has a corre-
sponding class ci where (ci =  1) if si reports H0 and (ci = 1) if si reports H1. This allows for the
measuring of the network’s assortative mixing, a term defined as the pairing of nodes with the same
class [25]. However, the network of sensors also needs meaningful edges for community detection.
The RCD module pairs any two sensors si; sj based on their class ci; cj and their mutual distance dij
from each other in order to observe spatial clustering.
The goal of the RCD module is to find an isolated and strongly concentrated group of sensors
that report H1. The Kronecker’s Delta Function () is a commonly used piecewise constant function
in assortative mixing to specify whether or not the two nodes are of the same class [25]:
(ci; cj) =
8>><>>:
0 if ci 6= cj
1 if ci = cj
(5.1)
A basic mathematical formula for discretely measuring the assortative mixing in a network can
be expressed by [25]:
X
edge(ij)
(ci; cj) =
1
2
X
ij
Aij(ci; cj) (5.2)
where ci; cj are the node classes and (ci; cj) is the Kronecker’s delta function from Eq. 5.1.
The left side of the Eq. 5.2 is a summation series that iterates through an edge list and increments for
each pair of the same class. The right side of Eq. 5.2 is the matrix formula which iterates through an
adjacency matrix and increments the same way. The one-half fraction from the matrix formula is there
to remove the double counting of pairs.
Consider Fig. 5.1, a network with two classes of nodes such that one class is designated by black
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Figure 5.1: Example of assortative mixing
circles and the other by red squares. In such a network, a node can have a degree for each class. Each
node ni keeps track of the number of edges connected to nodes of the same class, denoted as degree
ksamei , as well as the number of edges connected to nodes of a different class, denoted as degree k
diff
i .
The degree ksamei can be computed by Eq. 5.2. Similarly, the degree k
diff
i can be computed by the same
equation, i.e. Eq. 5.2, with the exception of inverting the sign for the Kronecker’s Delta Function.
Fig. 5.1 displays these two types of degrees above each node in the form of (ksame; kdiff) which can be
used to measure the strength of the assortative mixing.
5.2 Cluster Analysis Algorithm
My graph partitioning and community detection is based on the principle of assortative mixing, but
also has distinct differences. The RCD algorithm generates two graphs, SH1 and S, out of the sensor
network. The graph SH1 pairs sensors si and sj that reportH1 and the distance dij between them is below
some threshold d. The other graph S pairs sensors si and sj that report differently and are within the
same distance threshold d. The result is shown in Fig. 5.2, with SH1 represented as the network with
red edges and S with the blue edges. Afterward, the clustering strength is measured by the difference
of degrees from the nodes in SH1 and S for each disconnected component, which I refer to as the
clusters. These clusters are comprised of sensors that share the decision of H1 and are within distance
dij and remain disconnected from the rest of the network. Each node si carries two types of degrees
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Figure 5.2: RCD Clustering - illustrates the clustering method between rogue signals and randomly
selected malicious sensors
such that degrees dH1i is from the graph SH1 and degrees di is from the graph S.
The RCD has three requirements for graph partitioning and cluster analysis. First, it needs the
local spectrum decision ci 2 fH0;H1g for all sensors si 2 S. Second, there must be two sets of sensors
where SH0 = fsijci = H0g and SH1 = fsijci = H1g. Lastly, it needs an adjacency matrix A of size
jSj  jSj such that Aij = 1 if the distance dij < d; else Aij = 0, for sensors si and sj, regardless of local
decisions.
The RCD module locates k isolated clusters of sensors Ck such that sj 2 Ck, (Aij = 1) and
(ci = cj) for sensors si; sj 2 Ck. The RCD module’s goal is to locate isolated communities of sensors
reporting H1 (i.e. set of Ck clusters) that are distinctly separated by sensors reporting H0, i.e. sensors
in SH0 . To start, I measure the cluster density of sensors with the same class by counting all connected
pairs (si; sj) such that si; sj 2 Ck and Aij = 1. This is computed on all sensors in Ck with:
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D(Ck) = fdH1i gk = f
X
sj2Ck
(Aij(ci; cj))  1 j si 2 Ckg (5.3)
where (ci; cj), defined in Eq.5.1, indicates a difference in a node’s class c (i.e. the local spectrum
decision), fdH1i gk is the set of degrees for each si such that both si and sj share an edge and report H1,
and D(Ck) is Eq. 5.3 expressed as a function.
Next, I measure the isolation of sensor si 2 Ck from sj 2 SH0 by counting all connected pairs
(si; sj) such that (Aij = 1). This is computed on all sensors in Ck by:
D0(Ck; SH0) = fdi gk = f
X
sj2SH0
Aij0(ci; cj) j si 2 Ckg (5.4)
0(ci; cj) =
8>><>>:
0; if ci = cj
1; ifci 6= cj
where fdi gk is the set of degrees for each si such that both si and sj share an edge and report a
different local spectrum decision, and D0(Ck; SH0) is Eq. 5.4 expressed as a function.
Finally, the isolated clustering strength Zk is measured by:
Zk = Z(fdH1i gk; fdi gk) =
P
i d
H1
iP
i(d
H1
i + di )
(5.5)
which is used for deciding the presence of rogue signals. In the off chance that several malicious
sensors are positioned near each other, the RCD module uses a specified level of tolerance Z and a
required minimum cluster size Cmin to lower the sensitivity of flagging a rogue signal by mistake.
Additionally, Cmin prevents a high clustering score Zk resulting from an insignificant sized cluster. The
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pseudo-code of the RCD module is displayed in Algorithm 1.
Fig. 5.2 shows two scenarios; the RSF-45 scenario uses the same setup as Fig. 3.1 where each
rogue antenna transmits with a beamwidth of 45, and the SSDF-40 scenario is where 40% of the
sensors are randomly selected to become malicious and perform SSDF. The red nodes are sensors
reporting H1 and the blue nodes are sensors reporting H0. The red edges are formed when ci = cj and
dij < d for sensors si and sj. The blue edges are formed by the same rules except that ci 6= cj.
Algorithm 1 The RSF Cluster Detection Module
Function:RCD(A; SH0 ; SH1)
1: Initialize cluster index k 0
2: Initialize set of protected sensors Sp
3: Initialize set of visited nodes V
4: Initialize queue Q
5: for all si 2 SH1 do
6: if si =2 V then
7: k k+ 1
8: Initialize set Ck
9: add si onto Ck;V; and Q
10: while Q is not empty do
11: sq  dequeue(Q)
12: for all sj 2 SH1 do
13: if sj =2 V and Aqj = 1 then
14: add sj onto Ck;V; and Q
15: end if
16: end for
17: end while
18: fdH1i gk  D(Ck)
19: fdi gk  D0(Ck; SH0)
20: Zk  Z(fdH1i gk; fdi gk))
21: if jCkj  Cmin and Zk > Z then
22: Sp  Sp [ Ck
23: end if
24: end if
25: end for
26: return Sp
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5.3 Resilient to Exploitation
Since I use an environment that conforms to the IEEE 802.22 standard, I assume a static network of
CPE sensors. This eliminates the option of malicious SUs moving their sensors closer together in dense
clusters with the goal of exploiting the RCD module, such that it protects the reputation of malicious
sensors. It is possible that a group of malicious sensors remains in proximity to a static network, by
coincidence or otherwise, but the chances of this occurring can be reduced by increasing the minimum
cluster threshold Cmin or the cluster strength threshold Z.
Secondly, the RCD module only functions when the FC decision is H0 because rogue signals
are limited to causing local false alarms (i.e. H1) on attacked sensors. In other words, rogue signals
are only capable of switching local spectrum decisions from H0 to H1, so the RCD module ignores
the scenario of a misdetection. Therefore, malicious sensors attempting misdetection through SSDF
attacks will still be penalized when the FC decision is H1, whether they are clustered or not.
5.4 Defense Evaluation
I have two groups of scenarios, the RSF and SSDF attacks, for the defense simulations. The simulation
environment from Chapter 4 is reused for these simulations. The beamwidth of each rogue antenna
is 15, 30, and 45 for scenarios RSF-15, RSF-30, and RSF-45, respectively. The SSDF scenarios
simulate malicious sensors by randomly selecting a percentage of the sensors and raising their RSS by
20 dB from the noise floor. I randomly selected 20%, 30%, and 40% of sensors from the scenarios
SSDF-20, SSDF-30, and SSDF-40, respectively.
Fig. 5.3 shows the amount of mitigated trust damage with the RCD module under the same
scenarios. I refer to the mitigated trust damage as trust saved TS[q] and express it with:
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Figure 5.3: RCD performance - measures trust saved from Eq. 5.6
TS[q] =
TR[q]  T[q]
T[0]  T[q] (5.6)
where TR[q] is the network’s total trust on quiet period q when using the RCD module, T[q] is
the network’s total trust without the RCD module (from Fig. 4.2), and T[0] is the initial state of trust
scores. I use a minimum cluster size (Cmin = 5), a clustering threshold (Z = 0:3), and a distance
threshold (d = 150 m).
As shown in Fig. 5.3, each protocol benefited from my proposed defense against the RSF intru-
sion. However, the RCDmodule offered less protection to FA due to its sequential random sampling of
sensors, rather than of cross-examining all sensor reports for a more robust analysis. The spikes from
FB in Fig. 5.3 are results of protocol design from having a dynamic threshold for deciding malicious
sensors. During the spikes, FB’s dynamic threshold stabilizes as it replaces the old RSS statistics with
new data.
Fig. 5.4 compares how RCDmodule’s response to RSF and SSDF attacks in terms of the number
of sensors attacked SA and the number of sensors protected SP. The goal of my defense is to maximize
SP for the RSF scenarios and minimize it for the SSDF scenarios so that the reputations of malicious
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Figure 5.4: RCD Sensitivity - counts the number of sensors protected by the RCDmodule for RSF and
SSDF attacks
sensors are not protected. In scenario RSF-45, the strongest RSF intrusion, the RCD module protects
95% of sensors from losing trust. In contrast, the RCDmodule erroneously protects 15% of the sensors
in scenario SSDF-40. This is acceptable as 40% of malicious sensors is an unrealistic and profuse
amount of attacks in any CR network. The outcomes of Fig. 5.4 show a high resiliency against the
exploitation of SSDF attacks.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In my thesis, I demonstrated the RSF intrusion, a new threat to trust-based CSS protocols. The attackers
can transmit rogue signals onto groups of sensors to emulate SSDF and ruin their reputation with the
intent of having them removed from the shared spectrum sensing. My work cautions the use of trust-
based CSS protocols and warrants a line of defense against rogue signals. The RSF simulations were
conducted in a realistic environment based on the 802.22 WRAN and illustrates the impact of the RSF
intrusions on sensor reputation scores. To mitigate the trust damage, I introduced a new defense based
on community detection and cluster analysis. The simulation experiments showed that my defense
solution, the RCD module, could effectively keep the sensor reputations intact while distinguishing
rogue signals from malicious sensors.
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